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DESIGNING AROUND A PATENT INJUNCTION: 
DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR 
DETERMINING WHEN CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS ARE 
APPROPRIATE 
ABSTRACT 
Spurred by TiVo Inc. v. Dish Network Corp., this Comment proposes a 
factor-based framework for determining when contempt proceedings are 
appropriate in a patent infringement case. Once a court determines that an 
accused device infringes a patent and issues an injunction, the infringing party 
will often try to design around the injunction by creating a modified device. 
Patentees can then respond to potential continued infringement by instituting a 
new infringement suit or by making a motion for contempt. Previously, under 
the contempt framework established by KSM Fastening Systems, Inc. v. H.A. 
Jones Co., the district court was required to undertake a substantial analysis 
into the propriety of contempt proceedings. Unfortunately, TiVo, which 
overruled KSM, eliminated the threshold inquiry into the propriety of 
contempt proceedings and produced a contempt standard that creates a lack of 
notice, certainty, and consistency that will adversely affect all of the parties 
involved.  
A comprehensive contempt framework should provide the district courts 
with the means of creating a reasoned distinction between modified devices 
that merit contempt proceedings and those that merit a separate infringement 
suit. This Comment argues that the Federal Circuit should reinstate the 
threshold inquiry and proposes a factor-based analysis to strengthen the KSM 
standard. The result is a comprehensive framework for determining whether 
contempt proceedings are appropriate that would cure the deficiencies of the 
TiVo contempt analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Contempt in the context of patent infringement is the rare moment when 
criminal sanction and patent law interact.1 A prevailing patent owner, having 
already enjoined the defendant from further production of an enjoined 
infringing device, may still face the possibility of additional infringement if the 
defendant2 attempts to design around the injunction by creating a modified 
device. In response to the defendant’s design-around attempt, the patent owner 
will have the option of either instituting a separate suit to enjoin the modified 
device or making a motion for contempt. Unfortunately, the courts have failed 
to develop a sufficient framework to compare the enjoined device with the 
modified device and determine whether contempt proceedings are appropriate. 
Recently, TiVo Inc. v. Dish Network Corp.3 highlighted the confusion created 
by the lack of a comprehensive framework. 
TiVo brought suit against EchoStar4 alleging infringement of certain claims 
of U.S. Patent No. 6,233,389 (the ’389 Patent), titled “Multimedia Time 
Warping System.”5 EchoStar designs digital video recorders (DVRs) as a 
component of its satellite service, and these DVRs are “central to the ’389 
patent.”6 At trial, TiVo accused two categories of EchoStar DVR receivers of 
infringing the ’389 patent.7 The jury found that all of the pertinent claims of 
the ’389 patent were not invalid and that EchoStar willfully infringed the ’389 
patent by clear and convincing evidence.8 As a result, the jury awarded 
monetary damages to TiVo, and the court enjoined EchoStar from further 
 
 1 See KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[T]he 
contemnor may be punished by fine (payable to the patent owner) and imprisonment, even in civil contempt.”), 
overruled by TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 2 The defendant will also be referred to as the “infringing party” or the “enjoined party.” 
 3 640 F. Supp. 2d 853 (E.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part en banc sub nom. TiVo Inc. v. 
EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 4 Defendants EchoStar Communications Corporation, EchoStar DBS Corporation, EchoStar 
Technologies Corporation, EchoStar Satellite LLC, and EchoSphere LLC are collectively referred to as 
EchoStar. Id. at 857. The EchoStar companies operate and support the satellite television service known as 
“Dish Network.” Id. 
 5 Id. TiVo specifically asserted that the EchoStar receivers infringed claims 1, 5, 21, 23, 32, 36, and 52 
(together called the “Hardware Claims”), and claims 31 and 61 (the “Software Claims”) of the ’389 patent. Id. 
 6 Id. DVR systems allow “for simultaneous storage and playback of television signals from sources such 
as cable and satellite providers.” Id. 
 7 Id. TiVo specifically asserted that seven models of EchoStar DVR receivers—three models that used a 
chip from ST Microelectronics and four models that used a chip from Broadcom—infringed the ’389 patent. 
Id. 
 8 Id. 
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infringement.9 The injunction prohibited EchoStar “from making, using, 
offering to sell, selling or importing in the United States, the Infringing 
Products, either alone or in combination with any other product and all other 
products that are only colorably different therefrom in the context of the 
Infringed Claims.”10 
In response to the jury verdict, EchoStar invested seven hundred thousand 
dollars and eight thousand hours in an effort to design around the ’389 patent.11 
Engineers changed five thousand of the ten thousand lines of DVR code,12 and 
EchoStar subsequently consulted an intellectual property firm that advised 
EchoStar that the modifications to the DVR receiver should be sufficient to 
avoid further infringement.13 TiVo contended that, despite the modifications, 
EchoStar failed to comply with the injunction and continued to infringe the 
’389 patent.14 Rather than instituting a new infringement suit, however, TiVo 
made a motion to hold EchoStar in contempt.15 EchoStar responded by arguing 
that it had successfully designed around the ’389 patent and, as a result, should 
not be subject to contempt proceedings.16 The district court agreed with TiVo 
and found EchoStar in contempt of the court’s permanent injunction.17 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit used the “more than a colorable difference” 
standard from KSM Fastening Systems, Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., as discussed in 
greater detail in Part I, to decide whether contempt proceedings were 
appropriate.18 Under the two-step KSM analysis, the Federal Circuit found that 
EchoStar’s enjoined DVR and its modified DVR were “not more than 
colorably different” and that no substantial issues remained for the parties to 
 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 858. 
 11 Id. at 869. In comparison, EchoStar spent more than $120 million on advertising over the same time 
period. Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., No. 2009-1374, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4543, at *18 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 
4, 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part en banc, 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 14 Dish Network, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 857. 
 15 Id. at 856. Contempt authority is granted to the federal courts under 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2006), which 
provides that “[a] court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its 
discretion, such contempt of its authority, [as results from d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, 
process, order, rule, decree, or command.” Id. 
 16 Dish Network, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 857. 
 17 Id. at 874. 
 18 TiVo, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4543, at *7–8, *14, *16 (quoting KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. 
Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled en banc by TiVo, 646 F.3d 869) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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litigate in either a contempt proceeding or a separate trial.19 With only 
colorable differences between the two DVRs, the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
holding of the district court that contempt proceedings were appropriate.20 
On rehearing en banc, the Federal Circuit overruled the two-step KSM 
analysis and attempted to clarify the standard governing contempt proceedings 
in patent infringement cases.21 The court remanded to the district court to make 
a factual determination of colorable differences under the new standard,22 but 
the parties settled before the district court reached a decision.23 
EchoStar’s attempt to design around the ’389 patent demonstrated the 
uncertainty created by the KSM standard, and as this Comment will argue, the 
rehearing en banc failed to remedy the deficiencies of the KSM contempt 
analysis. This uncertainty is unsettling in light of the fact that contempt 
proceedings provide an important check on the scope of injunctions and are the 
gatekeeper for patent law’s transition to criminal sanction.24 Contempt 
proceedings offer a number of distinct advantages to the patent owner.25 Most 
importantly, the infringing party cannot raise unenforceability or invalidity in 
defense.26 In addition, the court handling the contempt proceeding is already 
familiar with the case, and as a result, the proceeding will be much quicker and 
cheaper than a separate infringement proceeding.27 Moreover, because the 
proceeding will take place in the same court that ordered the injunction, there 
is also the possibility that the court will look unfavorably on the accused 
infringer’s possible failure to obey the injunction.28 On the other hand, the 
 
 19 Id. at *13. 
 20 Id. at *19. 
 21 See TiVo, 646 F.3d at 881. 
 22 Id. at 884. 
 23 TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 429 F. App’x 975, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 24 See KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[T]he 
contemnor may be punished by fine (payable to the patent owner) and imprisonment, even in civil contempt.”), 
overruled en banc by TiVo, 646 F.3d 869. 
 25 See KIMBERLY A. MOORE ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 693 (3d ed. 2008) (listing the 
advantages to contempt proceedings for the patent owner). 
 26 See KSM, 776 F.2d at 1530 (finding that the court’s original claim construction is the law of the case in 
contempt proceedings). But see Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 154 F.3d 1345, 
1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (performing claim construction in a contempt proceeding). The defense of invalidity 
involves rebutting the presumption of a patent’s validity by showing that one or more of the patent’s claims are 
invalid. 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.02 (Supp. 2005). A patent can be unenforceable or 
invalid if the patent owner fraudulently obtained the patent-in-suit. Id. § 19.03. 
 27 MOORE ET AL., supra note 25, at 693. 
 28 Id. 
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patent owner will be faced with a greater burden to prove infringement by clear 
and convincing evidence.29 
For the infringing party, which faces a possibly unreasonable or overly 
broad injunction, the stakes in contempt proceedings are daunting, with 
possible punishment in the form of fine or imprisonment.30 Because of both the 
potential consequences and disadvantages of contempt proceedings, a clear 
framework for determining whether contempt proceedings are appropriate is of 
vital importance to the enjoined party and the integrity of the patent system. 
Both parties to a patent dispute should have a clearer understanding of the 
circumstances that will mandate contempt proceedings and require new suits 
for infringement. Accordingly, this Comment argues in favor of a threshold 
inquiry into the propriety of contempt proceedings and proposes a more 
concrete, factor-based framework to aid the courts in determining whether 
contempt proceedings are appropriate. 
Part I of this Comment explores the relationship between permanent 
injunctions and contempt in patent law. The standard for contempt serves the 
dual function of helping courts determine when contempt proceedings are 
appropriate as well as acting as a limit on the scope of injunctions. Almost 
twenty-five years ago, the Federal Circuit laid out a basic standard for 
determining when contempt proceedings are appropriate in KSM. Subsequent 
cases, however, including TiVo’s rehearing en banc, have failed to develop the 
standard in a satisfactory manner, resulting in considerable uncertainty to all of 
the parties involved. Part I further discusses the policies critical to a decision of 
whether to (1) sustain a motion to proceed with contempt proceedings or (2) 
institute a separate suit, including concerns over judicial economy, judicial 
uniformity, and incentives to patent and continue downstream innovation. 
Part II examines the process by which the district courts have decided 
whether to proceed with contempt proceedings in light of the absence of 
instruction from the Federal Circuit. District courts have used a number of 
factors to support their decisions, but deciding which factors are relevant, and 
to what extent the factors will weigh on the decision, varied markedly from 
case to case. While the district courts are inconsistent in how they utilize each 
factor, a limited number of specific factors can aid in creating a basis for 
establishing a more concrete contempt framework in patent law that can be 
consistently applied in all courts. 
 
 29 KSM, 776 F.2d at 1524. 
 30 18 U.S.C. § 402 (2006). 
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Part III of this Comment analyzes contempt law within other areas of 
intellectual property. Because of the number of similarities between patent law 
and other types of intellectual property law (and, consequently, the increasing 
number of recent Supreme Court decisions that use copyright law as a 
reference point for patent law and vice versa), copyright and trademark present 
a logical reference to aid in the further development of the contempt 
framework in patent law. The comparative analysis is beneficial because the 
role of good faith has historically been unclear in patent law, and despite the 
ruling in TiVo, trademark law clarifies that good faith should be a factor in the 
decision of whether contempt proceedings are appropriate. 
In light of the importance of the contempt standard in controlling the scope 
of an injunction and the lack of guidance from the Federal Circuit, a concrete, 
factor-based threshold inquiry will provide a clearer understanding of the 
circumstances that will mandate contempt proceedings and the circumstances 
that will require new suits for infringement. Part IV suggests a framework 
based on six factors for determining whether contempt proceedings are 
appropriate: the presence of additional expert testimony, further claim 
construction, additional substantial factual analysis or new theories of 
infringement, the enjoined party’s ability to obtain a patent on the modified 
device, the presence of good faith, and a balance of the hardships associated 
with a decision to proceed via contempt. Use of these factors will create more 
consistency and will subsequently provide greater notice to all of the parties 
involved. 
I. PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS AND CONTEMPT IN PATENT LAW 
To provide a context for the importance of contempt proceedings, this Part 
establishes the connection between narrowly drafted permanent injunctions in 
patent law and contempt proceedings. The current standard for determining 
whether contempt proceedings are appropriate, which this Comment argues is 
not sufficient, originated from language in the Supreme Court case of 
California Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor.31 The Federal Circuit further 
refined the analysis in KSM, but the substance of the KSM analysis was 
recently overruled in TiVo. This Part concludes with a discussion of the 
relevant policies that must be considered when deciding whether contempt 
proceedings are appropriate. 
 
 31 113 U.S. 609 (1885). 
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A. Connection Between Permanent Injunctions and Contempt in Patent Law 
Following the issuance of an injunction for patent infringement, an 
enjoined party may try to design around the originally infringed patent.32 
Confronted with the possibility of additional infringement, the patent owner 
may in turn attempt to discourage the infringing party through contempt 
proceedings or by instituting a separate suit to enjoin the modified device.33 
Contempt punishes the enjoined party for insulting the court by failing to obey 
the court order.34 Thus, before discussing the particulars of when contempt 
proceedings are appropriate, there is a benefit to understanding permanent 
injunctions in patent law. 
In a civil action for patent infringement, a court may order a judgment for 
money damages35 and an injunction as a remedy.36 Of the two basic types of 
injunctions, permanent and preliminary,37 this Comment is only concerned 
with the scope of a permanent injunction. According to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, “Every order granting an injunction . . . must: (A) state the 
reasons why it issued; (B) state its terms specifically; and (C) describe in 
reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—
the act or acts restrained or required.”38 Applied to patent law, the Patent Act 
grants courts permission to use “injunctions in accordance with the principles 
of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms 
as the court deems reasonable.”39 
The Supreme Court, finding that equitable relief is not mandatory in all 
instances of patent infringement,40 laid out the standard for determining 
whether a permanent injunction is appropriate in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange 
L.L.C.41 For a court to grant permanent injunction, 
[a] plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable 
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, 
 
 32 KSM, 776 F.2d at 1524. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 35 U.S.C. §§ 284, 289. 
 36 Id. § 283. 
 37 Cf. Lermer Ger. GmbH v. Lermer Corp., 94 F.3d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A permanent 
injunction issues to a party after winning on the merits . . . . A preliminary injunction is extraordinary relief 
that alters the status quo during the course of litigation.”). 
 38 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d) (emphasis added). 
 39 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 283, 66 Stat. 792, 812 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 283). 
 40 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006). 
 41 Id. at 391. 
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are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in 
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.42 
Once the court decides that a permanent injunction is the appropriate remedy, 
the court must tailor the injunction to the acts sought to be restrained.43 
Specifically tailoring the scope of an injunction has a number of benefits 
for all of the parties involved.44 A clearly defined injunction provides notice to 
the enjoined party of what is lawful, thereby eliminating uncertainty.45 
Moreover, a clearly defined injunction gives notice to the party protected by 
the injunction (generally the patent owner) so that it may effectively monitor 
and enforce the injunction.46 From the perspective of an appellate court, a 
clearly defined injunction enables it to be adequately prepared to review the 
injunction.47 Further, from the perspectives of the district court and judicial 
economy, a clear injunction reduces the need for judicial intervention because 
the parties should not have to return to court to debate the scope of the 
injunction. As a result, clearly defined injunctions provide a basis with which 
courts can analyze alleged failures to comply with an injunction and the 
necessity for contempt proceedings.48 Unfortunately, the courts have 
demonstrated that creating clearly defined injunctions can be a difficult task. 
As the Federal Circuit noted in KSM, “It is apparent . . . from a review of 
patent cases dealing with contempt proceedings that injunctions are frequently 
drafted or approved by the courts in general terms, broadly enjoining ‘further 
infringement’ of the ‘patent,’ despite the language of Rule 65(d), and Supreme 
Court interpretation.”49 
 
 42 Id. 
 43 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1)(C). 
 44 Stacey L. Dogan, Trademark Remedies and Online Intermediaries, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 467, 
487–88 (2010). 
 45 Id. at 487. 
 46 Id. at 487–88. 
 47 Id. at 487. 
 48 See id. at 487–88 (noting that the requirement of specificity in an injunction prevents undue guessing 
as to whether behavior is covered by an injunction). 
 49 KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled en banc 
by TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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B. Historical Standard for Determining Whether Contempt Proceedings Are 
Appropriate 
When courts issue broad injunctions, the possibility that an infringing party 
may violate the injunction increases significantly, and the standard for whether 
contempt proceedings are appropriate becomes more important. The Supreme 
Court first provided the basis for a standard for determining whether contempt 
proceedings are appropriate in California Paving.50 Subsequently, in KSM51 
and TiVo,52 the Federal Circuit expanded on the language from California 
Paving to create the current framework for the contempt analysis. 
In California Paving, the Supreme Court articulated the “fair ground of 
doubt” language that was the original basis for determining whether contempt 
proceedings were appropriate in the context of a patent infringement case.53 In 
that case, the patent owner obtained an injunction against a defendant to 
prevent further infringement of a patented method of laying pavement.54 Even 
after the court enjoined the defendant from further infringement, the defendant 
continued to lay pavement as part of a new construction project, and the patent 
owner contended that the defendant was still using the process for laying 
pavement as described in the patent.55 In the contempt proceeding, the circuit 
court judges disagreed as to whether the defendant’s method of laying concrete 
continued to infringe the patent.56 In response, the Supreme Court found that 
contempt proceedings are not appropriate when the judges disagree and 
notably commented that the “[p]rocess of contempt is a severe remedy, and 
should not be resorted to where there is fair ground of doubt as to the 
wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct.”57 The Federal Circuit subsequently 
used the language “fair ground of doubt” in KSM as a basis for developing a 
more comprehensive standard for determining whether contempt proceedings 
are appropriate.58 
 
 50 113 U.S. 609, 618 (1885). 
 51 See 776 F.2d at 1527. 
 52 See 646 F.3d at 882. 
 53 Cal. Paving, 113 U.S. at 618. 
 54 Id. at 610. 
 55 Id. at 617. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 618 (emphasis added). 
 58 E.g., KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1531–32 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled 
en banc by TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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With the language from the Supreme Court as a starting point, the Federal 
Circuit developed a two-step inquiry in KSM for the contempt analysis.59 In 
KSM, the patent owner obtained an injunction against the defendant to prevent 
further infringement of a patent claiming a particular hangar assembly for 
securing refractory linings to furnace walls.60 The defendant responded to the 
injunction by selling a modified hangar assembly, and the patent owner moved 
to punish the defendant with contempt for violating the injunction.61 
Surveying the case law, the court found a lack of uniformity in the 
standards for determining when contempt proceedings are appropriate.62 The 
court acknowledged that not all subsequent infringements by an enjoined party 
merit contempt proceedings.63 Before proceeding with an infringement 
analysis with respect to the redesigned product, the court stated that it must 
first determine whether contempt proceedings are the appropriate forum by 
comparing the enjoined device with the redesigned modified device.64 The 
court held that contempt proceedings are appropriate when an enjoined device 
and a modified device are merely colorably different.65 If there is more than a 
“colorable difference” between the enjoined and modified devices, then 
contempt proceedings are not appropriate.66 The court found that an exact 
standard “is difficult to articulate with precision, since it involves, to a large 
extent, the exercise of judicial discretion.”67 
To substantiate the threshold inquiry in the first step, the colorable-
difference analysis, the court rejected the use of a standard based on the 
doctrine of equivalents68 and adopted a procedural standard requiring the 
 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 1523. The injunction enjoining further infringement was pursuant to a settlement agreement that 
was entered as a consent decree. Id. 
 61 Id. at 1524. 
 62 Id. at 1525. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 1530–32. 
 65 Id. at 1531–32. 
 66 Id. at 1531. 
 67 Id. at 1530. 
 68 For purposes of infringement, patent law allows patent owners to claim both the literal scope of their 
patent claims as well as equivalents to each of the claims’ limitations under the doctrine of equivalents. See 
Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 16–17 
(2009). As a result, if a component is not literally present in an accused device, a court may still find 
infringement if the component is equivalent to the element in the claim. Id. Previous contempt standards used a 
formulation of the doctrine of equivalents to determine whether an enjoined device and accused device were 
merely colorably different. See, e.g., Interdynamics, Inc. v. Firma Wolf (Interdynamics II), 698 F.2d 157, 162 
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determination of whether any substantial open issues must be litigated to 
determine infringement.69 Expanding on the language from the Supreme Court 
in California Paving, the court held that substantial new issues provide a “fair 
ground of doubt” that the defendants have violated the injunction, and thus, 
contempt proceedings are inappropriate.70 Under this standard, courts can use 
principles of claim and issue preclusion to determine which issues have already 
been settled and which issues would have to be tried.71 Contempt proceedings 
are appropriate only if the issues are suitable for summary disposition, and 
consequently, a separate suit for infringement would most likely be appropriate 
if proceedings require “expert and other testimony subject to cross-
examination.”72 Further, in contempt proceedings, the patent owner may not 
revisit a previous claim construction to broaden the scope of the claims, and 
“[t]he validity of the patent is the law of the case in such proceedings.”73 
Ultimately, the decision to proceed with contempt proceedings was left to the 
discretion of the lower courts so long as such decisions were made in 
accordance with the constraints of the KSM standard.74 
C. Rejecting KSM and Developing a New Standard in TiVo 
The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc in TiVo, made the most dramatic 
changes since KSM to the contempt analysis by rejecting KSM’s two-step 
inquiry75 and clarifying the role of good faith.76 With regard to the two-step 
inquiry, the Federal Circuit took issue with the first step of the KSM analysis, 
which was the threshold inquiry of the propriety of initiating a contempt 
proceeding, because the analysis was often confused with the merits of 
contempt.77 As a result, the court “telescope[d] the current two-fold KSM 
inquiry into one, eliminating the separate determination whether contempt 
 
(3d Cir. 1982). The KSM court noted that “no correlation between infringement by the accused device and by 
the adjudged device necessarily exists as a result of their equivalence to each other.” KSM, 776 F.2d at 1528. 
 69 KSM, 776 F.2d at 1531–32. 
 70 Id. at 1532. 
 71 Id. Whether the original suit ended in a consent decree or was fully litigated affects the determination 
of what issues remain to be settled. Id. 
 72 Id. at 1531. 
 73 Id. at 1529. 
 74 Id. at 1532. Appellate courts, applying Federal Circuit law, review a district court’s decision to employ 
contempt proceedings for abuse of discretion. Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 503 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
 75 TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869, 880–81 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 76 Id. at 880. 
 77 Id. at 881. 
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proceedings were properly initiated.”78 The propriety of contempt proceedings 
is now left to the discretion of the trial court, and “[a]llegations that contempt 
proceedings were improper in the first instance do not state a defense to 
contempt.”79 
For the first step of the telescoped inquiry, the Federal Circuit continued to 
employ the colorable-differences standard to compare the newly accused 
product and the adjudged infringing product.80 The court rejected the 
infringement-based understanding of the colorable-differences test81 and 
clarified that “the contempt analysis must focus . . . on the differences between 
the features relied upon to establish infringement [in the adjudged infringing 
product] and the modified features of the newly accused products.”82 This 
approach requires the parties to focus their attention on the “elements of the 
adjudged infringing products that the patentee previously contended, and 
proved, satisfy specific limitations of the asserted claims.”83 If an element that 
was found to infringe has been modified, the next inquiry is whether that 
modification is significant.84 If the modifications are significant, then the 
newly accused product is colorably different from the adjudged infringing 
product. As a result, inquiry into whether the newly accused product actually 
infringes is irrelevant, and the court will not hold the defendant in contempt.85 
The difficulty in applying the TiVo analysis will undoubtedly arise in 
determining whether the modifications are significant. The Federal Circuit 
clarified that a district court may seek expert testimony in making the 
determination and advised that the “obviousness” of the modification will be a 
relevant consideration.86 While there is not a concrete rule, a nonobvious 
modification may tend to result in a finding that the modification was not 
 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. “What is required for a district court to hold a contempt proceeding is a detailed accusation from 
the injured party setting forth the alleged facts constituting the contempt.” Id. On review, the propriety of 
contempt proceedings will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. 
 80 Id. at 882. 
 81 The infringement-based understanding of the colorable-differences test required determining whether 
“substantial open issues with respect to infringement” existed. Id. (quoting KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. 
Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled en banc by TiVo, 646 F.3d 869) (internal quotation 
mark omitted). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. Determining the significance of the modification is a question of fact. Id. at 883. 
 85 Id. at 882. 
 86 Id. “The court must also look to the relevant prior art, if any is available, to determine if the 
modification merely employs or combines elements already known in the prior art in a manner that would have 
been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the modification was made.” Id. 
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significant.87 The Federal Circuit also advised that the analysis may take into 
account “the policy that legitimate design-around efforts should always be 
encouraged as a path to spur further innovation.”88 
If a court concludes that the modifications are insignificant, the next step 
will require determining whether the newly accused product continues to 
infringe the relevant claims.89 The court is required to evaluate the modified 
elements against the asserted claims of the patent-in-suit on a limitation-by-
limitation basis.90 The burden is on the patentee to prove both colorable 
differences and infringement by clear and convincing evidence.91 
Finally, the Federal Circuit clarified the role of good faith as a defense to 
civil contempt.92 EchoStar argued that contempt was improper “where the 
defendant engaged in diligent, good faith efforts to comply with the injunction 
and had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that it was in compliance.”93 
The court rejected EchoStar’s argument and held that intent alone cannot save 
an infringer from a finding of contempt.94 The court explained, however, that 
the presence of good faith could still be considered by the district court when 
assessing penalties.95 
D. Policies Underlying the Determination of Whether Contempt Proceedings 
Are Appropriate 
In moving beyond the current contempt standard and developing a more 
comprehensive framework for contempt proceedings, the courts must 
delicately balance the interests of all of the parties involved.96 Part D discusses 
the policy interests that the Federal Circuit used in developing the TiVo and 
KSM standards as well as other policy interests that remain crucial to the 
development of a more comprehensive framework. The Tenth Circuit provided 
 
 87 See id. at 883–84. 
 88 Id. at 883. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. The district court is bound by any claim construction previously performed in the case. Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 880. 
 93 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (identifying the 
conflicting interests involved in determining whether infringement should be adjudicated in contempt 
proceedings), overruled en banc by TiVo, 646 F.3d 869. 
SAIDMAN GALLEYS4 7/5/2012  2:10 PM 
2012] DESIGNING AROUND A PATENT INJUNCTION 877 
a succinct description of the conflicting interests in a passage, quoted by the 
Federal Circuit in KSM: 
Allowing the patentee to proceed by a summary contempt proceeding 
in all cases would unnecessarily deter parties from marketing new 
devices that are legitimately outside the scope of the patent in 
question. On the other hand, to require in each instance the patentee 
to institute a new infringement suit diminishes the significance of the 
patent and the order of the court holding the patent to be valid and 
infringed.97 
Along with the interests of judicial economy98 and judicial uniformity,99 the 
courts have a significant number of interests to balance while defining a 
comprehensive standard for contempt proceedings. 
In accord with the greater goals of patent law, a standard for contempt 
proceedings should ensure that the use of contempt does not hinder 
downstream innovation.100 Courts have consistently emphasized the 
importance of encouraging competitors to design around patented 
technologies.101 If a party feels that any attempt to design around the injunction 
will lead to a judgment of contempt, that party will be disinclined to invest the 
resources to work around the injunction.102 Of further consequence, a tendency 
to always resort to contempt proceedings will, in effect, broaden the scope of 
patents by deterring parties from marketing new devices that may fall outside 
the scope of the patents.103 This deterrent effect would give patent owners 
protection beyond the mere equivalents of their inventions.104 The proper use 
of contempt proceedings ensures that the patent owner has the appropriate 
level of protection to maintain the integrity of the patent system while ensuring 
 
 97 Id. (quoting McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 395 F.2d 230, 233 (10th Cir. 1968)). 
 98 MOORE ET AL., supra note 25, at 693 (“[A] contempt proceeding is generally quicker and significantly 
less expensive than a second full trial.”). 
 99 KSM, 776 F.2d at 1527. 
 100 See Brief of Amici Curiae Five Law Professors in Support of Defendants-Appellants’ Petition for 
Rehearing En Banc at 1, TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., No. 2009-1374, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4543 (Fed. Cir. 
Mar. 4, 2010) [hereinafter TiVo Brief of Amici Curiae]. 
 101 See WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[P]atent law 
encourages competitors to design or invent around existing patents.”); TiVo Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 
100, at 2. 
 102 See TiVo Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 100, at 1, 6. 
 103 Id. at 6; see also KSM, 776 F.2d at 1530. 
 104 For a discussion on the doctrine of equivalents in patent law, see supra note 68. 
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continued incentives for enjoined parties to attempt to design around the 
patents-in-suit.105 
Courts also seek uniformity in a framework for determining whether 
contempt proceedings are appropriate.106 A framework for the proper use of 
contempt proceedings should be consistent between circuits to ensure 
uniformity in the scope of relief available to the patent owner.107 Without 
uniformity, forum shopping will continue until the plaintiff finds the court with 
the most beneficial policies.108 While a uniform standard for the scope of 
injunctions would be an ideal prerequisite, judges instead have a great deal of 
discretion within the dictates of Rule 65(d) for framing injunctions.109 A 
uniform contempt framework alleviates the concern over unreasonable and 
overly broad injunctions by confining the discretion of judges to certain 
boundaries defined by a single and clear contempt framework.110 
Finally, the courts must consider the greater goal of judicial economy.111 
Forcing parties to undertake a new trial each time there is a dispute over a 
previously adjudicated infringing device would add unnecessary strain to the 
court system and work against the goals of judicial economy.112 The courts 
must seek a framework that balances the respective interests of the parties and 
also makes the most efficient use of the courts’ time.113 
As the law currently stands, both parties are at a distinct disadvantage 
because of the lack of certainty involved in deciding whether contempt 
proceedings are appropriate.114 TiVo effectively eliminated any potential for 
 
 105 See KSM, 776 F.2d at 1530; see also State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (stating that infringing design-around efforts “should not be discouraged by punitive damage 
awards except in cases where conduct is so obnoxious as clearly to call for them”). 
 106 See KSM, 776 F.2d at 1527. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 See id. 
 111 See TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., No. 2009-1374, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4543, at *15 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 
4, 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part en banc, 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Federal Circuit panel 
decision was withdrawn in favor of reinstating the appeal to the Federal Circuit sitting en banc. TiVo Inc. v. 
EchoStar Corp., 376 F. App’x 21 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The policy considerations discussed in the panel opinion 
were not modified by the en banc decision. 
 112 See id. at *15–16. 
 113 See id. at *15 (“Compelling the parties to undertake a new trial every time there is a dispute over 
previously adjudicated infringing products would fail to serve the goals of judicial economy.”). 
 114 In TiVo, the actions by EchoStar in anticipation of a permanent injunction and subsequent to the jury 
verdict highlight the confusion and lack of certainty over the standard for contempt proceedings. EchoStar paid 
fifteen engineers to spend eight thousand hours in an effort to design around the ’389 patent and consulted 
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notice and uniformity by placing the determination of whether contempt 
proceedings are appropriate entirely at the discretion of the district court 
judge.115 Accordingly, the contempt standard as it currently stands is 
inadequate and requires further development to address the concerns of all of 
the parties involved. 
II. SURVEY OF CONTEMPT IN THE DISTRICT COURTS 
Prior to TiVo, as a result of the lack of instruction from the Federal Circuit, 
the district courts filled out the standard for determining whether contempt 
proceedings were appropriate on a case-by-case basis. According to one 
district court judge, “KSM and Additive Controls leave unclear exactly what 
makes a change in products ‘merely colorable,’ what creates a ‘substantial 
open issue of infringement’ and how a court should compare the new product, 
the original product and the claims of the patent to make the[ contempt] 
determinations.”116 While the Federal Circuit overruled KSM and the threshold 
inquiry, TiVo’s standard for contempt proceedings gives even less instruction 
to a district court about these issues and leaves the propriety of contempt 
proceedings to the complete discretion of a district court judge.117 As a result, 
to develop a more comprehensive framework, there is value in understanding 
how district courts have proceeded in the absence of instruction from the 
Federal Circuit. A survey of contempt decisions by the district courts118 
revealed the tendency of the courts to focus primarily on whether the dispute is 
 
with a prominent intellectual property firm; nevertheless, the Federal Circuit panel affirmed the decision of the 
lower court finding contempt. Id. at *18. 
 115 See TiVo, 646 F.3d at 881. 
 116 First Years, Inc. v. Munchkin, Inc., No. 07-cv-558-bbc, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99279, at *5 (W.D. 
Wis. Oct. 26, 2009). 
 117 TiVo, 646 F.3d at 881. 
 118 District court cases that included discussion of whether contempt proceedings were appropriate were 
collected using a search on LexisNexis. For purposes of reproduction, the search focused on district court 
cases from the past fifteen years that included LexisNexis headnote thirty-four from KSM, which tracks the 
following excerpt from the case: 
Under the . . . standard for determining a colorable difference, a party may seek relief by way 
of contempt proceedings only if the issues are appropriate for summary disposition. If substantial 
issues need to be litigated, particularly if expert and other testimony subject to cross-examination 
would be helpful or necessary, the court may properly require a supplemental or new complaint. 
The question to be answered under such standard is essentially a procedural one. Must 
substantial new issues be litigated to determine infringement? 
KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled en banc by TiVo, 
646 F.3d 869. The search focused on KSM because there have been relatively few cases considering contempt 
post-TiVo. 
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appropriate for resolution by summary proceedings.119 Using various factors, 
the summary nature of the proceedings has effectively served as a proxy for 
determining whether the differences between the modified device and enjoined 
device are merely colorable. 
Expert testimony was one of the factors most consistently used to 
determine whether contempt proceedings were appropriate.120 Courts varied on 
whether the use of expert testimony was appropriate in contempt proceedings, 
from holding that expert testimony presented a complete bar to contempt 
proceedings121 to allowing the limited use of expert testimony in contempt 
hearings.122 In some cases the absence of expert testimony was sufficient for 
the court to find that contempt proceedings were appropriate,123 while in 
another case a court used extensive expert testimony that had been 
incorporated into a magistrate’s recommendation to find that contempt 
proceedings were appropriate.124 
Even in some cases where expert testimony was not required, the courts 
found that contempt proceedings were still inappropriate because of the need 
for further claim construction.125 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has 
held that claim construction is a matter of law for the court to consider,126 
making it generally more conducive to summary proceedings. As with expert 
 
 119 The notion that contempt proceedings are appropriate only if the issues are appropriate for summary 
disposition is consistent with the policy of KSM. See id. 
 120 See, e.g., Suntiger, Inc. v. Telebrands Adver. Corp., No. 97-423-A, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26564, at 
*18 (E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2003) (“Of particular significance to a determination of whether the product 
comparison yields ‘substantial open issues’ of infringement is the agreement of all experts on certain key 
facts . . . .”). 
 121 See Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp., No. 1:04-0387, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9999, at *16 (W.D. 
Mich. Feb. 5, 2010) (rejecting the use of contempt proceedings because “expert testimony, accompanied by 
testing, seems necessary to resolv[e] th[e] dispute”). 
 122 See, e.g., Brine, Inc. v. STX, L.L.C., 367 F. Supp. 2d 61, 68 n.3 (D. Mass. 2005) (“The fact that the 
Court convened a two-hour evidentiary hearing involving expert testimony does not, itself, indicate that 
‘substantial new issues’ are presented by the dispute.”); Litecubes L.L.C. v. N. Light Prods., Inc., No. 
4:04CV00485-ERW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20085, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 21, 2007) (using expert testimony to 
decide whether there were substantial open issues of infringement). 
 123 See, e.g., Bass Pro Trademarks, L.L.C., v. Cabela’s, Inc., No. 03-3124-CV-S-RED, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 44979, at *6 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 24, 2005) (“There appears to be no need for additional factual or expert 
evidence. Therefore, a summary contempt proceeding is appropriate to decide infringement in this case.”). 
 124 Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., No. 01 C 6934, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83976, at *3, *8–10 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2008). 
 125 See, e.g., Inzer v. Frantz, No. 91 C 4228, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14439, at *12–13 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 
2002) (denying the motion for contempt because, among other reasons, additional claim construction would be 
required). 
 126 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384–85 (1996). 
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testimony, there is a lack of consistency between the courts in how they factor 
in the necessity for further claim construction. In some instances further claim 
construction rendered contempt proceedings unavailable,127 while in other 
cases claim construction was not a barrier to the use of contempt 
proceedings.128 
An additional factor considered by the district courts was the need for 
analysis of substantial factual evidence.129 To compare the modified device 
with the enjoined device, certain cases required further analysis of factual 
evidence, and as a result, some courts found that contempt proceedings were 
inappropriate.130 Other courts delved into a thorough comparison of the 
modified device, the enjoined device, and the patent-in-suit; in some cases, the 
differences were “substantial” and contempt proceedings were 
inappropriate,131 while in other cases, the differences were “insubstantial” and 
contempt proceedings were appropriate.132 The analysis relied heavily on the 
discretion of the court, and it is quite difficult to categorize the manner in 
which courts were deciding whether contempt proceedings were appropriate. 
Often, however, as an exception to the general lack of consistency exhibited by 
the district courts, where the further factual analysis coincided with new 
 
 127 See, e.g., Mahurkar v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., No. 91 C 8243, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12262, at *8–9 (N.D. 
Ill. Aug. 3, 1999) (denying the motion for contempt because, among other reasons, additional claim 
construction would be required). 
 128 See, e.g., Bass Pro Trademarks, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44979, at *6 (finding that further claim 
construction is not a bar to contempt proceedings); Aero Prods. Int’l, Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp., No. 02 C 
2590, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9792, at *10–11 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2005) (“Construing new terms at this stage 
does not preclude the use of contempt proceedings.”). 
 129 See, e.g., Mahurkar, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12262, at *9 (“In this case we find that analysis of 
substantial factual evidence is necessary to determine whether [the accused device infringes the patents-in-
suit].”). 
 130 See, e.g., Suntiger, Inc. v. Telebrands Adver. Corp., No. 97-423-A, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26564, at 
*18 (E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2003) (stating that requiring further factual development is a contributing factor to the 
decision to deny the motion for contempt). 
 131 See, e.g., Mykrolis Corp. v. Pall Corp., No. 03-10392-GAO, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 518, at *12 (D. 
Mass. Jan. 12, 2005) (denying the motion for contempt in one instance after having sustained the motion for 
contempt in another instance because the “questions are ‘substantial’ enough to be more properly addressed 
outside the context of the issue of contempt”); TA Instruments, Inc. v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., No. 95-545-SLR, 
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5953, at *13 (D. Del. Mar. 28, 2002) (denying the motion for contempt because the 
differences alleged by the parties created substantial issues that were inappropriate for resolution through a 
contempt proceeding). 
 132 See, e.g., Mykrolis, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 518, at *11 (sustaining the motion for contempt in two 
instances, after having denied the motion in another instance, because the “two devices are merely colorable 
imitations of the [patent-in-suit]”). 
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theories of infringement, courts refused to find that contempt proceedings were 
appropriate.133 
Other factors related less to the summary nature of contempt proceedings 
and instead spanned a range of other miscellaneous interests. Some courts 
made the decision of whether contempt proceedings were appropriate with the 
explicit goal of balancing the incentive to design around patents against the 
interest of maintaining the integrity of the patent system.134 Other factors 
included the presence of good faith, which, in spite of Federal Circuit 
precedent, continued to be a relevant factor in a limited number of cases.135 
Other courts used less common factors, including the “polar positions of the 
parties”136 and a sufficient level of certainty that the differences were merely 
colorable.137 Most courts, however, felt that contempt proceedings may be 
appropriate “when changes to a product relate only to features not claimed in 
the patent because such changes are ‘merely colorable.’”138 
The district courts utilized a variety of factors, but the ultimate decisions 
relied more on the use of judicial discretion. The factors were tools to help 
explain the decisions, but viewed as a whole, these decisions failed to create a 
workable framework that would lead to uniformity in patent law. While the 
decision-making process of the district courts does not present a dramatic 
change from the guidelines laid out by Federal Circuit precedent, the absence 
 
 133 See TruePosition Inc. v. Andrew Corp., No. 05-747-SLR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43510, at *17–18 (D. 
Del. May 4, 2010) (stating that the differences between the enjoined device and modified device presented 
new theories of infringement, and courts “must exercise restraint in affording the patent owner the benefit of 
contempt proceedings to litigate . . . new patent infringement claims”). 
 134 First Years, Inc. v. Munchkin, Inc., No. 07-cv-558-bbc, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99279, at *6 (W.D. 
Wis. Oct. 26, 2009) (“[T]he question whether a contempt hearing is the proper forum should be considered in 
light of [policy interests].”). 
 135 See, e.g., Electrovert Ltd. v. Specnor Tecnic Corp., No. 8:00-cv-2033-T-26, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
80267, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 13, 2010) (“A ‘colorable difference’ in the device is one only ‘made for the 
purpose of evading the decree without essential change in the nature of the device.’” (quoting KSM Fastening 
Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1530–31 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled en banc by TiVo Inc. v. 
EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011))). 
 136 See, e.g., id. at *5. 
 137 See, e.g., Kooima v. Zacklift Int’l, Inc., No. CIV 01-4078, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56295, at *8–9 
(D.S.D. June 30, 2009) (“Because it cannot be said with certainty that the differences . . . are merely colorable, 
contempt proceedings are inappropriate . . . .”). The court failed to elaborate on what was meant by 
“certainty.” 
 138 First Years, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99279, at *5; see also Suntiger, Inc. v. Telebrands Adver. Corp., 
No. 97-423-A, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26564, at *15–16, *18 (E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2003) (arguing that the 
comparison of the adjudicated infringing product with the redesigned accused product, for the purposes of 
determining whether substantial open issues of infringement exist, “focuses solely on product features which 
are potentially read upon by the asserted claims of the [patent-in-suit]”). 
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of a concrete framework creates inconsistency between cases. Different courts 
use the aforementioned factors in different ways, emphasizing some at the 
expense of others and creating uncertainty in the minds of both the patent 
owner and enjoined party as to how the court will proceed. The role of 
discretion in TiVo makes it unlikely that the lack of consistency in the district 
courts will be remedied. The confusion at the district court level demonstrates 
the need to improve the current contempt standard to improve the notice and 
consistency afforded to the proceedings. 
III.  PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS AND CONTEMPT OUTSIDE OF PATENT LAW 
In light of the uncertainties engendered by a lack of a uniform framework 
in the past and the current deficiencies of the new standard adopted in TiVo, 
the connection between patents and other areas of intellectual property makes 
copyright and trademark law a logical comparative source for developing a 
contempt framework in patent law. Through a discussion of contempt in 
copyright and then trademark law, the following analysis contributes to this 
Comment’s proposed factor-based framework by recognizing the role of good 
faith in the analysis. Beyond good faith, trademark law introduces the concept 
of a buffer zone to effectively punish the trademark owner who has already 
been previously adjudged to infringe the mark-in-suit. While this is a potential 
solution for adding notice and enhancing the current contempt framework, this 
section will argue that the nature of the incentives in patent law makes this sort 
of change impractical. 
In both copyright and trademark, there is very little discussion of whether 
contempt proceedings are appropriate because the practical implications of 
proceeding in contempt rather than instituting a separate suit are minimal. 
Contempt proceedings in trademark and copyright will almost always be 
summary in nature relative to patent litigation.139 Regardless of the potential 
informative value of the comparative analysis, however, the exercise is 
 
 139 The issues in patent litigation tend to be much more complex than those in copyright and trademark 
litigation. Compare Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing the relative 
similarity of books), with Abbott Labs. v. Apotex, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 831 (N.D. Ill. 2006), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 503 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (comparing the differences 
between a pharmaceutical drug and a pharmaceutical patent). Thus, the consequences of proceeding with 
contempt proceedings in copyright and trademark are relatively inconsequential. As a result, the comparison 
with copyright and trademark concerns whether the court should hold the infringing party in contempt, rather 
than whether contempt proceedings are appropriate. The analysis remains relevant because the standards still 
require the court to make a distinction between an accused mark or copyright and a design-around mark or 
copyright. 
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beneficial as means of understanding contempt in patent law in the context of 
other intellectual property. 
A. Copyright 
Because of the similarity in the underlying incentives between patent and 
copyright law, courts in the past have looked to copyright law to aid in further 
developing patent law concepts.140 With origins in the Constitution, both 
copyrights and patents are legal devices intended to promote their respective 
fields by providing a set of exclusive rights.141 “A copyright, like a patent, is 
‘at once the equivalent given by the public for benefits bestowed by the genius 
and meditations and skill of individuals and the incentive to further efforts for 
the same important objects.’”142 As discussed below, copyright law ultimately 
fails to contribute to a contempt framework in patent law, but because of the 
recent emphasis on the relationship between patent law and copyright law, a 
brief discussion of the contempt process under copyright law remains 
relevant.143 
Like patent law, the scope of an injunction resulting from copyright 
infringement should also be narrowly tailored to the adjudicated infringing 
acts.144 Courts generally prefer not to issue blanket injunctive statements that 
merely enjoin the infringing party from breaking the law.145 However, 
notwithstanding the general principles for issuing narrowly tailored 
 
 140 See, e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2066–67 (2011) (referencing a 
Supreme Court copyright decision for guidance on contributory infringement); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006) (referencing copyright law to affirm an approach to permanent 
injunctions in patent law); Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935–37 
(2005) (referring to patent law for the standard for active inducement to address a question of inducement in 
the copyright context); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214–17 (2003) (referencing the legality of the 
legislative extension of the duration of patent terms while addressing the legality of the legislative extension of 
copyright terms); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434–35, 439 (1984) 
(referring to patent law for the standard for contributory infringement to address a question of contributory 
infringement in the copyright context). 
 141 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). 
 142 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127–28 (1932) (quoting Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 
322, 328 (1858)). 
 143 For a list of cases emphasizing the relationship between patent law and copyright law, see supra note 
140. 
 144 Waldman Publ’g, 43 F.3d at 785. 
 145 See, e.g., Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849, 852 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004) (“By permanently 
enjoining defendants . . . [, the court] threatens defendants with contempt sanctions . . . , contrary to the 
principle that blanket injunctions to obey the law are disfavored.”). 
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injunctions, the question of whether a party has violated an injunction and 
should be held in contempt is not always clear.146 Absent simple copying in the 
case of further copyright infringement, courts determine proper injunctive 
scope, as well as whether a defendant has subsequently violated an existing 
injunction, via copyright’s contempt standard.147 
For purposes of illustration, in Frye v. YMCA of Lincoln,148 the court faced 
the question of whether the defendant should be held in contempt as a result of 
possible further copyright infringement.149 To prove further copyright 
infringement, the plaintiff had to prove that there was “substantial similarity” 
between the accused work and the original copyrighted work in both ideas and 
expression.150 The substantial similarity analysis required two steps.151 “First, 
similarity of ideas is analyzed extrinsically, focusing on objective similarities 
in the details of the works. Second, if there is substantial similarity in ideas, 
similarity of expression is evaluated using an intrinsic test depending on the 
response of the ordinary, reasonable person to the forms of expression.”152 The 
court in this case held that an evidentiary hearing would be required to assist in 
determining whether the two expressions in question were substantially 
similar.153 
Under a Frye-type analysis, during the first step of the substantial similarity 
analysis, courts may use expert testimony to show the similarity of ideas, while 
the second step of the analysis requires the response of an ordinary person.154 
Analogizing to patent law, the ordinary person standard could be modified into 
 
 146 See, e.g., Frye v. YMCA of Lincoln, No. 4:98CV3105, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41905, at *6 (D. Neb. 
May 18, 2009) (“However, it is not clear at this time whether this similarity of ideas is substantial or if any 
similarity of expression is substantial and protectable under the copyright law.”). 
 147 See, e.g., id. at *4 (“Therefore, the YMCA should be held in contempt for violating the injunction if 
the Court finds substantial similarity between the two productions.”). 
 148 Frye was one of very few cases that I was able to find where the courts addressed copyright 
infringement during contempt proceedings. Simple copying proved to be significantly more common in 
copyright cases, and as a result, the standard for contempt in copyright did not seem to have the same 
significance as under patent law. 
 149 Id. at *1. 
 150 Id. at *4. In addition to substantial similarity, the plaintiff also had to prove that he owned the right to 
the copyright in question and that the defendant had access to that copyright. Id. 
 151 Id. at *4–5. 
 152 Id. at *5 (quoting Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1987) (citation 
omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 153 Id. at *6. 
 154 Hartman, 833 F.2d at 120. 
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a standard based on a person having ordinary skill in the art;155 however, the 
testimony of a person having ordinary skill in the art would presumably be 
unnecessary following the testimony of an expert witness. Even the first step 
alone—the default use of expert testimony to discuss the objective similarities 
of the inventions in question—has the potential to turn many contempt 
proceedings into full-blown trials under the pretext of contempt proceedings. 
While in a copyright context courts may be able to easily repeat the copyright 
infringement analysis for contempt proceedings, a second, complete patent 
infringement analysis would eliminate the distinction between contempt 
proceedings and a new separate trial in patent law. Contempt proceedings for 
copyright infringement will almost always be conducive to summary 
proceedings, and as a result, the implications of proceeding via contempt or a 
separate trial are minimal. 
B. Trademark 
While there is no clear solution in copyright law, trademark law provides a 
potential resource for developing a more concrete framework. Unlike the 
incentives to invent and innovate in patent law, trademark law focuses on 
preventing consumer confusion; trademarks protect the consumer by 
preventing “the use of confusingly similar marks on similar or related goods 
and services of others.”156 Although the policy rationales underlying trademark 
law do not directly correspond with patent law in the same manner as 
copyright law, there is practical overlap between patent and trademark law 
with respect to protection of product design.157 Trademark introduces two 
concepts that can potentially be applied to patent law: namely, the concept of a 
buffer zone around the mark-in-suit and the influence of good faith. While the 
buffer zone is an intriguing concept, ultimately only good faith is applicable to 
a framework in patent law. 
Under trademark law there are traditionally two standards—a strict 
majority standard and a liberal minority standard—for determining whether an 
enjoined party’s new trademark is so similar to the original trademark covered 
 
 155 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (stating that a patent may not be obtained if the “subject matter as a 
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art 
to which said subject matter pertains”). 
 156 Jim Jubinsky, Note, Copyright and Trademark: Are They Too Substantially Similar for Literary 
Works?, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 389, 390 (1997). 
 157 Moshe H. Bonder, Patent & Lanham Acts: Serving Two Legitimate Purposes or Providing an 
Indefinite Monopoly?, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 6–9 (2004). 
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by an injunction that a court should hold the enjoined party in contempt.158 
Similarly to patent law, the basic issue during a contempt proceeding for 
trademark infringement is whether the enjoined party used “colorable 
imitations” of the enjoined trademark.159 “Colorable imitation” means “any 
mark which so resembles a registered mark as to be likely to cause confusion 
or mistake or to deceive.”160 Under the strict standard, the enjoined party 
“should thereafter be required to keep a safe distance away from the dividing 
line between violation of, and compliance with, the injunction.”161 In other 
words, the court will create a buffer zone around the particular mark that is 
only applicable to that enjoined party. In contrast, under the liberal minority 
standard, courts apply the same test for determining infringement in contempt 
proceedings as they do in the original infringement proceeding.162 In both 
infringement proceedings, the main issue is whether “the newly adopted mark 
[is] so similar to plaintiff’s mark that it is likely to cause confusion.”163 
Under the strict majority standard, the court in Wolfard Glassblowing Co. 
v. Vanbragt upheld a finding of contempt against the defendant for violating a 
consent judgment and permanent injunction that enjoined the defendant from 
making or selling oil lamps that were colorable imitations of the plaintiff’s oil 
lamps.164 The court required the plaintiff to successfully show that the 
defendant “violated the consent judgment beyond substantial compliance” and, 
relevant to patent law, “that the violation was not based on a good faith and 
reasonable interpretation of the judgment.”165 The court held that, to establish 
violation of a consent decree, the plaintiff did not need to prove a likelihood of 
consumer confusion in the same manner that would be required in a trademark 
infringement case.166 
Although the terms of such an injunction impose a heavier burden on 
an infringing party with a redesigned mark than is imposed on a 
newcomer with a similar mark, “a party who has once infringed a 
 
 158 3 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 14.02(d) (2000). 
 159 Wolfard Glassblowing Co. v. Vanbragt, 118 F.3d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 160 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 161 LALONDE, supra note 158, § 14.02(d) n.182 (quoting Eskay Drugs, Inc. v. Smith, Kline & French 
Labs., 188 F.2d 430, 432 (5th Cir. 1951)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 162 Id. § 14.02(d). 
 163 Id. 
 164 118 F.3d at 1321. 
 165 Id. at 1322 (emphasis added). 
 166 Id. 
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trademark may be required to suffer a position less advantageous than 
that of an innocent party.”167 
Without this strict standard, the owner of a trademark would be required to 
institute an entirely new trademark suit to protect against an enjoined party that 
had attempted to bypass an injunction by making only “tiny change[s].”168 
The liberal minority view fails to offer any direction to a contempt standard 
under patent law because, analogizing to patent law, simply repeating the 
patent infringement analysis would eliminate the distinction between contempt 
proceedings and new infringement proceedings. In contrast, the strict majority 
view under trademark would add a degree of clarity to the decision. The buffer 
zone between the patent-in-suit and any design-around devices would improve 
the degree of notice afforded to the parties; however, the notice would come at 
the expense of the enjoined party. By adding certainty, the balance of interests 
stressed in KSM would tilt toward the patent owner and harm the incentive to 
design around the injunction. Contempt law would effectively broaden the 
patent by broadening the scope of any injunction or consent agreement. While 
trademark cases under the strict view acknowledge the handicap on the party 
attempting to design around the injunction, the nature of the incentives in 
trademark law—and specifically the prevention of consumer confusion—
allows for a handicap. In contrast, the incentives in patent law make the 
handicap difficult to rationalize because any handicap harms the incentive to 
design around an injunction and further advance science. The absence of any 
requirement under trademark law to sustain an incentive to design around an 
injunction makes analogizing contempt under trademark law to that under 
patent law very difficult. 
In summation, copyright fails to inform a new framework in patent law 
because the practical implications of contempt proceedings are minimal in a 
copyright infringement case. Unlike patent law, the proceedings will almost 
always be summary in nature. Trademark law introduces the concept of a 
buffer zone, but the nature of the incentives in trademark law, unlike those in 
patent law, allows for a buffer zone. While a comparative analysis is relevant 
regardless of the potential benefits, this comparative analysis also advises on 
the role of good faith in patent law. The Federal Circuit has historically taken 
 
 167 Id. (quoting Wella Corp. v. Wella Graphics, Inc., 37 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
 168 Id. at 1323. 
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numerous views on the role of good faith,169 and while TiVo seemingly ended 
the discussion,170 it is still informative to note the use of good faith during 
contempt proceedings in trademark law. Patent law does not exist in isolation, 
and a framework for whether contempt proceedings are appropriate should be 
constructed in reference to other areas of the law.171 
IV.  DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK 
Using the rough guidelines of the Federal Circuit, some of the factors 
employed by the district court decisions, and the role of good faith from 
trademark law, this Part proposes a more concrete, factor-based approach to 
contempt proceedings. This Comment argues that the Federal Circuit was 
wrong to reject the threshold inquiry into the propriety of contempt 
proceedings. As a result, this Comment’s approach maintains the two-step 
inquiry reinstating the threshold inquiry into whether contempt proceedings are 
appropriate.172 However, in contrast to the KSM framework, application of this 
proposed framework to the facts of TiVo counsels against the use of contempt 
proceedings.173 
A. Rejecting the Federal Circuit: Reinstating the Threshold Inquiry 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the en banc TiVo decision was the 
elimination of the threshold inquiry into the propriety of contempt proceedings. 
The Federal Circuit argued this initial step was unnecessary because the 
“inquiry confuses the merits of the contempt with the propriety of initiating 
contempt proceedings[, and] . . . as a practical matter, district courts do not 
separately determine the propriety of a contempt proceeding before proceeding 
 
 169 See Arbek Mfg., Inc. v. Moazzam, 55 F.3d 1567, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (using good faith as a factor in 
determining whether contempt proceedings were appropriate). But see Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., 
Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 154 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discounting the use of good faith as a factor in 
determining whether contempt proceedings are appropriate). 
 170 See TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (discounting good faith 
as a defense in contempt proceedings). 
 171 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (comparing patent law to copyright 
law to ensure a consistent approach to the treatment of injunctions). 
 172 The second step, the infringement analysis comparing the modified device with the patent-in-suit, is 
not a focus of this Comment. 
 173 The en banc panel in TiVo remanded to the district court for a determination under the new contempt 
framework, but the parties settled before the district court addressed the issue. TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 
429 F. App’x 975 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Thus, the facts of TiVo have not yet been analyzed by a court under the 
new contempt standard. 
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to the merits of the contempt itself.”174 Review of district court cases, however, 
demonstrates that the Federal Circuit was incorrect; district courts generally 
determine separately the propriety of a contempt proceeding before continuing 
to the merits of contempt.175 
For example, in Aero Products International, Inc. v. Intex Recreation 
Corp., the district court followed the two-step analysis as required by KSM.176 
After finding that the plaintiffs demonstrated by “clear and convincing 
evidence that no substantial open issues of infringement exist with the 
redesigned device,” the court found that contempt proceedings were an 
appropriate method of determining whether the redesigned product infringed 
the patent-in-suit.177 Just as originally prescribed in KSM,178 the district court’s 
threshold inquiry examined whether there were substantial open issues of 
infringement with the redesigned product.179 As discussed supra in Part II, 
KSM failed to explain to the district courts what constitutes “substantial open 
issues of infringement,” but as demonstrated by, inter alia, Aero Products, this 
deficiency still did not cause the courts to conflate the two steps of the KSM 
inquiry. Once the court in Aero Products determined that contempt 
proceedings were appropriate, it moved on to the second step to determine 
whether the redesigned product infringed the claims of the patent-in-suit.180 
While a court’s decision that contempt proceedings are appropriate may be 
indicative that a court should hold a party in contempt, numerous district court 
decisions demonstrate that the courts are able to properly distinguish the 
propriety of contempt proceedings from the merits of contempt.181 
 
 174 TiVo, 646 F.3d at 881. As a practical matter, the Federal Circuit also failed to explain why possibly 
confusing the merits of contempt with the propriety of contempt proceedings was an issue. 
 175 See, e.g., Kooima v. Zacklift Int’l, Inc., No. CIV 01-4078, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56295, at *8–9 
(D.S.D. June 30, 2009); Bass Pro Trademarks, L.L.C. v. Cabela’s Inc., No. 03-3124-CV-S-RED, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 44979, at *4–5 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 24, 2005); Aero Prods. Int’l, Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp., 
No. 02 C 2590, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9792, at *9–10 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2005). But see First Years, Inc. v. 
Munchkin, Inc., No. 07-cv-558-bbc, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99279, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 2009) 
(conflating the two steps of the KSM analysis). 
 176 See Aero Prods., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9792, at *7–16. 
 177 Id. at *12–13. 
 178 KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1530–32 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (adopting a 
procedural standard requiring the determination of whether any substantial open issues must be litigated to 
determine infringement), overruled en banc by TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 179 Aero Prods., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9792, at *12–13. 
 180 Id. at *13. 
 181 For a list of cases, see supra note 175. 
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B. Creating a Factor-Based Framework 
To substantiate the reinstatement of the threshold inquiry, this Comment 
proposes a factor-based framework for determining whether contempt 
proceedings are appropriate. While similar in some respects to the manner in 
which district courts have proceeded in the absence of Federal Circuit 
instruction, this proposed framework for the propriety of contempt proceedings 
reduces the number of factors for the courts to consider, adds a degree of 
consistency and increased certainty, and maintains room for judicial discretion. 
Relying on only a subset of the factors considered by the district courts, this 
framework further defines the individual significance of each of the factors, 
defines the relationship between each factor, and provides a context with 
which to view each factor. The result is a more comprehensive framework that 
will be easier to consistently apply, affording notice and certainty to all of the 
parties involved. The decision of whether to proceed with contempt 
proceedings should depend on six factors: 
1. the requirement of additional expert testimony; 
2. the need for further claim construction; 
3. additional substantial factual analysis or newly proposed theories 
of infringement; 
4. the ability of the enjoined party to obtain a patent for the modified 
device; 
5. good faith; and 
6. a balance of the hardships implicated by a decision to proceed with 
contempt proceedings. 
While the facts of each case will not necessarily implicate each factor, the 
court should weigh the relevant factors to decide if contempt proceedings are 
appropriate. 
1. Expert Testimony, Further Claim Construction, and Further Factual 
Analysis or New Theories of Infringement 
In assessing the first three factors—expert testimony, further claim 
construction, and further factual analysis or new theories of infringement—
courts should place significant emphasis on the interests of judicial economy. 
As previously discussed, to require a new infringement trial in every instance 
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would be impractical. The judge that adjudicated the original infringement 
proceeding is already familiar with the facts and, more importantly, the 
technology of the case. While considerations of judicial economy may create a 
slight bias toward allowing contempt proceedings, the last two factors—the 
presence of good faith and a balance of the hardships—will work to balance 
out any preference in favor of contempt proceedings. 
Courts should weigh the first factor, expert testimony, with a view toward 
preserving the summary nature of contempt proceedings. The presence of 
expert testimony alone must not preclude the use of contempt proceedings; 
however, extensive expert testimony is indicative of significant 
modifications.182 The concern with denying a motion for contempt whenever 
the judge requires expert testimony is the possibility that enjoined parties may 
be able to consistently evade contempt proceedings.183 Especially in the 
pharmaceutical context, “[n]o judge is qualified to determine by looking at a 
heap of powder . . . whether a change in the process by which a chemical is 
made has altered the chemical structure of the product without scientific testing 
conducted by experts.”184 Some fields may always require expert testimony, 
and to deny contempt proceedings merely because of the need for experts 
would render contempt worthless as a device to protect the patent owner.185 As 
a result, expert testimony should be less influential to the extent that a judge 
requires the testimony to further understand the issues at hand. However, when 
the parties heavily rely on expert testimony and require further demonstrative 
scientific testing, a court should deny contempt proceedings because these 
circumstances indicate significant modifications.186 
The absence of the second factor, the need for further claim construction, 
should weigh in favor of contempt proceedings. Often, additional claim 
construction is indicative of new theories of infringement or more than a mere 
colorable difference between the modified and enjoined device; however, in 
 
 182 Significant modifications are indicative of more than colorable differences. TiVo, 646 F.3d at 882–83. 
Under KSM, “substantial open issues with respect to infringement” indicated more than colorable differences. 
Id. at 882 (quoting KSM, 776 F.2d at 1532) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 183 Abbott Labs. v. Apotex, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 831, 839–40 (N.D. Ill. 2006), rev’d on other grounds 
sub nom. Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 503 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 See, e.g., Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp., No. 1:04-0387, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9999, at *16–
17 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 5, 2010) (rejecting the use of contempt proceedings because “the parties’ reliance on 
experts to address th[e] issue[ made] expert testimony, accompanied by testing, seem[] necessary to resolv[e] 
th[e] dispute”). 
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other cases claim construction may not be indicative of significant 
modifications, and consequently, contempt proceedings would be 
appropriate.187 Alternatively, claim construction may apply in a different 
manner for analyzing the modified device than analyzing the original enjoined 
device. To the extent that the court must reconstrue the claim construction that 
was previously applied by a jury to determine infringement, this factor should 
weigh in favor of instituting a separate infringement suit. In contrast, this 
factor should weigh in favor of contempt proceedings in the name of judicial 
efficiency if the court is simply reapplying the previously construed claims. 
The third factor, the presence of new theories of infringement or further 
factual analysis, should counsel against the use of contempt proceedings. Both 
are indicative of significant modifications and, as a result, must heavily weigh 
in favor of instituting a separate suit. Absent special circumstances, 
adjudicating new theories of infringement would be contrary to the purpose 
behind contempt proceedings. New theories of infringement are indicative of 
significant modifications that would not be appropriate for contempt 
proceedings;188 the parties should have the opportunity to litigate over these 
significant modifications in a new trial.189 In contrast, whether further factual 
analysis weighs in favor of contempt proceedings may be dependent on 
whether a judge or jury resolved the infringement in the underlying case. If the 
underlying case was a bench trial and if the analysis is appropriate for 
summary disposition, this factor should weigh in favor of contempt 
proceedings. However, while contempt proceedings are based in equity,190 this 
factor should weigh in favor of a new infringement suit if a jury resolved the 
underlying infringement case. The enjoined party is already at a distinct 
disadvantage because it is in a potentially hostile courtroom191 and unable to 
 
 187 See, e.g., Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 154 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). But see KSM, 776 F.2d at 1529 (determining that previously adjudicated claims may not be 
broadened in contempt proceedings where the validity of the patent is the law of the case). 
 188 See TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[T]he contempt 
analysis must focus initially on the differences between the features relied upon to establish infringement and 
the modified features of the newly accused products.”); TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., No. 2009-1374, 2010 
U.S. App. LEXIS 4543, at *39–40 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 4, 2010) (Rader, J., dissenting) (stating that new theories of 
infringement are not appropriate for contempt proceedings), aff’d in part, vacated in part en banc, 646 F.3d 
869. 
 189 At this point the plaintiff has already had his day in court, and as a result, he should not be able to raise 
new theories of infringement. If the modified device requires new theories of infringement to find further 
patent infringement, the plaintiff should raise the new theories of infringement in a new trial. 
 190 See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2006) (providing that the power to punish is at the discretion of the court). 
 191 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 25, at 693. 
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present any affirmative defenses during contempt proceedings.192 As a result, 
the enjoined party should have the opportunity to present any new substantial 
factual concerns to a jury, and this factor should weigh in favor of a new 
infringement suit. 
2. The Existence of Patents Associated with the Modified Device, the 
Presence of Good Faith, and a Balance of the Hardships 
The presence of the fourth factor, the existence of any patents associated 
with the modified device, should weigh against contempt proceedings. While 
the Federal Circuit has stated that the existence of a patent is not dispositive,193 
if the enjoined party has submitted all of the relevant materials to the patent 
examiner, the existence of a patent should be indicative of more than mere 
colorable differences. A patent examiner’s determination that the modified 
device was nonobvious in light of the patent-in-suit and enjoined device should 
strongly weigh against the use of contempt proceedings. 
The fifth, and perhaps the most controversial, factor is the role of good 
faith. While discounted by the Federal Circuit in TiVo,194 the comparative 
analysis in Part III demonstrated that good faith is a relevant factor for 
contempt proceedings in trademark law. Because contempt is an affront to the 
court,195 a good-faith effort to comply with a court’s decision should militate 
against the use of contempt proceedings.196 The role of good faith, however, is 
complicated by a party’s ability to portray a guise of good faith in order to 
evade contempt proceedings. The expense of “extensive” research and the use 
of “substantial” man-hours to design around an injunction will almost always 
pale in comparison to the cost of additional damages and costs associated with 
contempt proceedings. The burden of demonstrating good faith would be 
greater when the alleged infringer is a competitor of the patent owner, while 
the burden might be lower if the infringing party’s device will have no effect 
 
 192 Additive Controls, 154 F.3d at 1350 (explaining that, during contempt proceedings, the enjoined party 
may only argue in its defense that the modified device does not infringe and it may not present invalidity or 
unenforceability as an affirmative defense). 
 193 See id. at 1350–51 (finding that the existence of a patent on the accused device was not relevant 
because the file history showed that neither the infringing device nor the original device was submitted to the 
patent examiner). 
 194 TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 195 KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled en banc 
by TiVo, 646 F.3d 869. 
 196 A colorable difference in the device is one obviously “made for the purpose of evading the decree 
without essential change in the nature of the device.” Id. at 1531 (emphasis added) (quoting Am. Foundry & 
Mfg. Co. v. Josam Mfg. Co., 79 F.2d 116, 118 (8th Cir. 1935)). 
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on the patent owner’s business. In summation, good faith should weigh against 
the use of contempt proceedings, but the presence of good faith alone should 
not be conclusive. 
Following pre-TiVo Federal Circuit case law, the court should also consider 
expert testimony (the first factor) in light of the presence of good faith. The 
rule of expert testimony precluding contempt proceedings should apply, as the 
Federal Circuit has indicated, only in the context of “a good-faith effort to 
modify a previously adjudged or admitted infringing device.”197 To the extent 
that there is significant evidence of good faith—to be determined on a case-by-
case basis—and the litigation requires extensive expert testimony, these two 
factors should be almost dispositive in favor of instituting a new suit. 
The sixth factor is a balance of the hardships implicated by a decision to 
proceed with contempt proceedings. Reflecting sentiments from the district 
courts,198 language from KSM,199 and language from TiVo,200 this factor 
requires an analysis of the effects on the patent system from the perspective of 
both the enjoined party and the patent owner. On one extreme, allowing the 
patent owner to have access to contempt proceedings in every instance would 
have the effect of deterring attempts to design around injunctions.201 At the 
other extreme, requiring a new infringement suit every time there is an attempt 
at a design-around attempt would harm the significance of the patent and the 
holding of the court in the original infringement proceeding.202 This factor will 
also be necessary to counterbalance any of the negative consequences of 
focusing on judicial economy with the first three factors. To the extent that a 
focus on judicial economy is harming the interests of either party, this factor 
should work to restore the balance. The facts of the case may rarely implicate 
 
 197 Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 503 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Arbek Mfg., Inc. v. 
Moazzam, 55 F.3d 1567, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 198 See First Years, Inc. v. Munchkin, Inc., No. 07-cv-558-bbc, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99279, at *6 (W.D. 
Wis. Oct. 26, 2009) (“[T]he question whether a contempt hearing is the proper forum should be considered in 
light of the [conflicting interests of the patent owner and the enjoined party].”). 
 199 KSM, 776 F.2d at 1530 (stating that the “conflicting interests” of the patent owner and the enjoined 
party ought to be considered when determining “whether infringement should be adjudicated in contempt 
proceedings”). 
 200 TiVo, 646 F.3d at 883 (noting that the analysis of whether contempt proceedings are appropriate may 
“take account of the policy that legitimate design-around efforts should always be encouraged as a path to spur 
futher innovation” but that determining that a design around a patent was permissible “should not be used to 
mask continued infringement”). 
 201 KSM, 776 F.2d at 1530. 
 202 Id. 
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policy interests, but policy should be a significant aspect of any contempt 
framework. 
Ultimately, the court must balance all six factors, to the extent each is 
present in a given case, to decide whether contempt proceedings are 
appropriate. One factor in particular, possible new theories of infringement or 
further substantial factual analysis following a jury verdict—while not 
dispositive—should be weighted heavily toward instituting a separate suit 
because this factor is highly indicative of the appropriateness of contempt 
proceedings. In contrast, when the courts do not require expert testimony and 
there are no substantial new theories of infringement, the court should move 
forward with contempt proceedings.203 The absence of these two factors should 
be almost dispositive in light of the summary nature of contempt proceedings. 
The court must examine the rest of the factors in the context of the facts of the 
particular case. 
Even to the extent that the Federal Circuit is correct about the confusion 
created by a two-step inquiry, this Comment’s framework remedies that 
confusion. In the past, any possible confusion resulted from a lack of 
instruction by the Federal Circuit about how to proceed with the threshold 
inquiry.204 This lack of instruction caused the district courts to develop their 
own methods for resolving the threshold inquiry, and these methods confused 
the two steps of the KSM analysis.205 This Comment’s factor-based analysis 
reduces any potential confusion by establishing a clear framework for the 
threshold inquiry. While the presence of new theories of infringement has a 
role as a factor in the analysis, presence of this factor does not resolve the 
second part of the KSM analysis: the infringement analysis. Even to the extent 
contempt proceedings are appropriate, the court must still proceed with an 
infringement analysis. 
Further, the benefits of a threshold inquiry outweigh any possible negative 
consequences. The threshold inquiry, especially in the form proposed by this 
Comment, gives a greater deal of notice to the litigating parties. Rather than 
 
 203 See, for example, Brine, Inc. v. STX, L.L.C., 367 F. Supp. 2d 61, 67–68 (D. Mass. 2005), where 
contempt proceedings were appropriate when the court found no outstanding legal issues and only required a 
two-hour evidentiary hearing. 
 204 See First Years, Inc. v. Munchkin, Inc., No. 07-cv-558-bbc, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99279, at *5 (W.D. 
Wis. Oct. 26, 2009) (“KSM and Additive Controls leave unclear exactly what makes a change in products 
‘merely colorable,’ what creates a ‘substantial open issue of infringement’ and how a court should compare the 
new product, the original product and the claims of the patent to make the[ contempt] determinations.”). 
 205 For further discussion on the methods employed by the district courts, see supra Part II. 
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leaving the parties at the complete discretion of the judge as to whether a 
design-around attempt will necessitate contempt, this framework allows the 
parties to at least make an educated guess about the propriety of contempt. The 
survey of district court decisions in Part II demonstrated the confusion created 
by too much discretion, and TiVo provides for even more discretion than the 
KSM approach. Reinstating a threshold inquiry and the resulting increased 
predictability has a number of benefits, including limiting the potential impact 
of forum shopping. A uniform standard that minimizes the role of discretion 
would limit the potential for any surprises after a design-around attempt. 
A factor-based threshold inquiry also prevents contempt proceedings from 
becoming a full trial under the guise of contempt. Previously, under KSM and 
other Federal Circuit precedent, the threshold inquiry ensured that contempt 
would be a summary proceeding.206 After TiVo, the summary nature of 
contempt proceedings is no longer a limit on the discretion of the trial court 
judge. The propriety of contempt proceedings is left entirely to the discretion 
of the judge, and “[a]llegations that contempt proceedings were improper in 
the first instance do not state a defense to contempt.”207 Nothing in TiVo 
indicates that the contempt proceedings should be anything more than 
summary proceedings, but there is no longer a requirement that this be 
considered with respect to contempt proceedings. The threshold inquiry 
preserves the summary nature of contempt proceedings and gives the adjudged 
infringer a defense with a lower standard than abuse of discretion.208 As a 
result, even to the extent that the courts confuse the two steps, the added notice 
and potential conservation of judicial resources weigh in favor of a threshold 
inquiry. 
C. Applying the New Framework to TiVo 
Using these six factors in the context of KSM’s two-step inquiry will create 
a more substantial framework that will provide all of the parties involved with 
a greater level of certainty, consistency, and notice. Applying this factor-based 
framework to the facts in TiVo yields a different result than that reached by the 
district court under KSM. While TiVo believed there were two theories under 
which EchoStar should be held in contempt,209 this Comment only focuses on 
 
 206 KSM, 776 F.2d at 1531. 
 207 TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869, 881 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 208 The court in TiVo gave no indication about what would constitute abuse of discretion. 
 209 TiVo Inc. v. Dish Network Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 853, 859–60 (E.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part en banc sub nom. TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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the second theory—that EchoStar’s design-around attempt was not 
sufficient.210 The district court found that contempt proceedings were 
appropriate because the differences between the infringing software and the 
modified software were not more than colorably different.211 Contempt 
proceedings were appropriate because the “modifications d[id] not relate to 
elements of the pertinent patent claims.”212 The court reasoned that, despite the 
fact that the modifications presented new theories of infringement, the 
differences between the enjoined software and modified software did not 
present substantial issues for litigation.213 The district court acknowledged the 
evidence of good faith but, citing to Federal Circuit precedent, found that good 
faith was not relevant to the decision.214 
Specifically, the district court examined two modifications relating to 
software claims 31 and 61 of the ’389 patent that presented two new theories 
of infringement.215 With regard to claim 31, there was a “parsing” limitation 
that was a part of the process for detecting programming start codes from the 
incoming broadcast data.216 EchoStar’s receivers retrieved data from the 
broadcast signal and created an index of the start codes for easy retrieval.217 
Following claim construction in which the district court construed “parsing” as 
analyzing, the jury found that EchoStar’s indexing system for retrieving 
programming data satisfied the parsing limitation.218 For the design-around 
attempt, EchoStar replaced the indexing system with an “indexless” statistical 
approximation, or “brute-force” approach.219 As a result, for the contempt 
motion, TiVo abandoned its original infringement theory and focused on a 
separate structure, the PID filter, which TiVo had intentionally not claimed to 
be infringing during the original trial.220 The district court, agreeing with TiVo, 
found that EchoStar’s PID filter satisfied the parsing limitation because it also 
 
 210 The second theory of infringement related to EchoStar’s failure to comply with the disablement 
provision of the injunction by failing to disable DVR functionality in the enjoined receivers. TiVo, 640 F. 
Supp. 2d at 859. 
 211 Id. at 871. 
 212 Id. at 870. 
 213 Id. at 870–71. 
 214 Id. at 869–70. 
 215 Id. at 864. 
 216 Id. at 865. 
 217 Id. at 864. 
 218 Id. at 865. 
 219 Id. at 864. 
 220 See id. at 865. PID filtering “involves analyzing the incoming data stream and selecting the appropriate 
packets of data associated with a program or channel selected by the viewer.” Id. 
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parsed incoming data, and the court held that the two EchoStar DVRs were 
“not more than colorably different.”221 
The second new theory of infringement concerned the modifications 
relating to software claim 61’s “automatic flow control” limitation and the 
DVR’s ability to record data to a hard drive.222 EchoStar’s original DVR 
consisted of eleven buffers in a circular structure, including one buffer that 
EchoStar intended to act as a “record buffer” that would control the flow of 
data from the ten transport buffers to the hard drive.223 In the modified 
software, EchoStar removed the record buffer, leaving only ten buffers that 
were still in a circular structure.224 EchoStar argued that, by eliminating the 
blocking function of the record buffer, the DVR software no longer satisfied 
the automatic-flow-control limitation.225 The court found that the data loss was 
nearly identical with both the enjoined software and modified software, but the 
manner in which the software dealt with the data loss differed between the two 
devices.226 Nonetheless, the district court found that the enjoined software and 
the modified software were only colorably different.227 
When analyzed under this Comment’s proposed framework, the EchoStar 
design-around attempt clearly necessitates a new trial, rather than contempt 
proceedings. Addressing the factors in the order presented above, the district 
court required expert testimony to perform the contempt analysis.228 According 
to the district court, “Given the complex technology in this suit, this Court 
believes that expert testimony was helpful . . . [because] this Court [required 
expert testimony] to analyze the source code in EchoStar’s modified 
software.”229 While this factor alone is far from dispositive, it weighs against 
the use of contempt proceedings, because expert testimony is not conducive to 
summary proceedings. The weight of this factor is tempered by the fact that the 
court required the expert testimony to better understand the technology, rather 
than allowing the parties to request expert testimony for litigation purposes.230 
 
 221 Id. at 870. 
 222 Id. at 866. 
 223 Id. at 865–66. 
 224 Id. at 866. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. at 870–71. 
 227 Id. at 871. 
 228 Id. at 862 n.4. 
 229 Id. 
 230 See id. (“Although expert testimony may not be necessary with regard to more tangible technology, the 
Court found it helpful under the circumstances of this case.”). 
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For the second and third factors—the need for further claim construction 
and factual analysis or new theories of infringement—the facts that the district 
court had to reapply the claim construction to a previously nonadjudicated 
DVR component, undertake further factual analysis, and adjudicate new 
theories of infringement231 should weigh heavily away from the use of 
contempt proceedings. While the court did not need to reconstrue any 
additional claims, unlike in the district court trial, where TiVo argued that the 
indexing system satisfied the parsing limitation, TiVo relied on the PID filter 
to satisfy that same parsing limitation.232 Moreover, the alleged flow-control 
limitation, the eleventh buffer, was no longer present in EchoStar’s DVRs.233 
As a result, the district court was required to undertake further factual analysis 
and reapply the claim construction to EchoStar’s alleged newly infringing 
DVR components234—a role that would normally be reserved for the finder of 
fact. The PID filter and buffer removal present new theories of infringement 
that are not appropriate for contempt proceedings and cannot be resolved 
through claim and issue preclusion. Perhaps reapplication of claim 
construction alone can be conducive to summary proceedings, but the 
combination of new theories of infringement, further factual analysis, and 
expert testimony is not appropriate for contempt proceedings. 
Addressing the final three factors, EchoStar did not attempt to acquire a 
patent on the new DVR configuration, and as a result, the fourth factor, the 
presence of any patents, has no bearing on the facts of the case. For the fifth 
factor, there was extensive evidence of good faith by EchoStar, including an 
investment of seven hundred thousand dollars and eight thousand hours in an 
effort to design around the ’389 patent.235 EchoStar engineers changed five 
thousand of the ten thousand lines of DVR code236 and consulted an 
intellectual property firm, which advised EchoStar that the modifications to the 
DVR receiver should be sufficient to avoid further infringement.237 While this 
appearance of good faith pales in comparison to the $120 million EchoStar 
spent on advertising over the same period,238 the appearance of good faith, 
 
 231 TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., No. 2009-1374, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4543, at *40 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 4, 
2010) (Rader, J., dissenting), aff’d in part, vacated in part en banc, 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 232 TiVo, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 865. 
 233 Id. at 866. 
 234 Id. at 870–71. 
 235 Id. at 869. 
 236 Id. 
 237 TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., No. 2009-1374, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4543, at *47 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 4, 
2010) (Rader, J., dissenting), aff’d in part, vacated in part en banc, 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 238 TiVo, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 869. 
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while not dispositive, should still weigh in favor of instituting a new 
infringement suit. Following Federal Circuit precedent, the presence of good 
faith also gives further credence to the presence of expert testimony weighing 
against contempt proceedings.239 
With respect to the final factor, a balance of the hardships, the facts of this 
particular case do not shift the weight of this factor in any particular direction. 
TiVo and EchoStar are two direct competitors, and EchoStar’s effort to design 
around TiVo’s patent does not seem to have any implications for altering the 
currently existing incentives to innovate. This is not such an extreme case that 
granting contempt proceedings or instituting a separate suit for infringement 
would alter the perceived strength of the patent system or reduce the incentive 
to design around patents. 
Notwithstanding the absence of a number of proposed factors, the presence 
of new theories of infringement, the need for further factual analysis, and the 
presence of good faith suggest that there are more than colorable differences 
between the enjoined software and the modified software. Contempt 
proceedings, while appropriate in some circumstances, deal with an affront to 
the court, and the facts of TiVo do not indicate that the court should subject 
EchoStar to contempt proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
TiVo highlights the concern over the contempt standard established by the 
Federal Circuit in KSM and subsequent cases. The current TiVo standard, 
which eliminates the threshold inquiry of the propriety of contempt 
proceedings, creates an uncertain standard that fails to effectively provide 
notice to any of the parties involved in the litigation. The enjoined party should 
be aware of what will be a lawful action moving forward, and the party 
protected by the injunction should have notice such that it may be able to 
effectively enforce the injunction. As a result, in the context of the Supreme 
Court’s “fair ground of doubt” standard and the two-step inquiry laid out by 
KSM, this proposed framework utilizes six factors to provide an element of 
certainty and consistency that will ensure parties have sufficient notice and 
overly broad injunctions are properly constrained. 
This proposed framework will allow the courts to consider the 
consequences of accepting or denying motions of contempt on the balance of 
 
 239 Though this is admittedly questionable after the en banc TiVo decision. 
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incentives that are crucial to the patent system. By frequently and wrongfully 
allowing the patent owner to proceed with contempt proceedings, the court 
reduces the incentive to design around an injunction and become a competitor 
in the market. Deterring individuals from proceeding with inventions that are 
legitimately outside the scope of the patent-in-suit would significantly harm 
downstream innovation. The courts would be giving the patent owner an 
undeservedly broad patent scope, and the incentives of the patent system 
would suffer as a result. 
In the alternative, awarding a new infringement suit for every attempted 
design-around would lessen the significance of the patent and the order of the 
court that instituted the injunction. The economic costs on both parties, as well 
as on the court system, would not be sustainable long term. As a result, this 
Comment’s proposed factor-based analysis in the context of a threshold 
inquiry strives to allow the court to balance the competing policy 
considerations. While a more exact framework is difficult to articulate because 
the decision to proceed with contempt proceedings must be applied on a case-
by-case basis and always involves a significant exercise of judicial discretion, 
this new framework should allow the courts to remedy the confusion 
highlighted by TiVo. 
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